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Psychosocial Theory and Political Violence

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ABSTRACT

This paper proposes the integration of psychosocial theory in the study of political violence in order to better understand the initiation of state terror. Drawing on theories of political leadership and political violence, this study examines the relationship between the personality of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and the initiation of state terror in the aftermath of the military coup d'etat carried out in Chile on September 11, 1973. To explore this issue, this paper focuses on the applicability of psychosocial theories of political leadership to the study of political violence, combining Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development with Ted Robert Gurr's preconditions for state terror in explaining the violent aftermath of the military coup. Finally, this research concludes that Pinochet's personality contained within it a potential for violence which when first manifest contributed to the onset of state terror after the 1973 coup.

Keywords: Psycopolitical analysis, Political violence, Comparative politics, State terror.

INTRODUCTION

This paper proposes the integration of psychosocial theory in the study of political violence in order to better understand the initiation of state terror. Drawing on theories of political leadership and political violence, this study examines the relationship between the personality of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte and the initiation of state terror in the aftermath of the military coup d'etat carried out in Chile on September 11, 1973.

The Pinochet case resonates throughout the discipline of political science from the application of international law to the study of democratization. Yet, many aspects of Pinochet's rule remain unexplained. This paper focuses on the applicability of psychosocial theories of political leadership to the study of political violence. It relies heavily on the synthesis of Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development with Ted Robert Gurr's preconditions for state terror in explaining

the violent aftermath of the 1973 military coup. Gurr's conceptualization of state terror as "a patterned activity in which instrumental violence recurs often enough that threats of similar violence that are made then or later, have their intended effects on the conflict outcomes (1986:46)" is used to explore the hypothesis that individual psychological factors have a significant impact on the initiation of state terror.

Psychosocial Theory and Political Science

During the first half of the twentieth century, there may have been some hope that the study of personality and politics would flourish. However, with its increasing emphasis on creating a more scientific political science via uniformity of research design and replicable quantitative methods, the behavioral revolution may have crowded out the study of personality and politics without actually discrediting it. Thus, writing in 1964, Lewis Edinger blames the lack of analysis of individual leaders in part on "the theoretical and methodological orientation identified with the so-called behavioral approach to the study of politics (428)". However, he concludes that the differences are not entirely irreconcilable but require striking a balance between the

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"purely artistic and purely scientific" using the scientific imagination (438). For Greenstein, "The study of personality and politics is possible and desirable, but systematic intellectual progress is possible only if there is careful attention to problems of evidence, inference, and conceptualization" (1992). In the post behavioral state of the discipline, there seems to be even more effort placed on creating a synthesis that can bring together what appears today as three competing approaches to the study of politics: rational choice, structural, and cultural (Lichbach and Zuckerman, 1997). Psychosocial theory contributes to such theorizing at its joints through a compatible interface with each of the dominant trends.

Rational choice scholars have already applied their framework to the aggregate study of political leadership. Further theoretical insight may lead to quantification of certain aspects of personality and more refined conceptualizations of what it means to be rational and when personality should be considered a significant causal mechanism in policy-making.

Psychosocial theory can contribute to these efforts as well as in the increasing use of narratives to help explain outliers and anomalies.

The psychosocial approach places special importance on the individuals' position within the society while it does not negate the importance of social structure of the individual. Instead, it emphasizes the dialectic between the two. In that way, Erikson's assertion that, "each successive stage and crisis [in human growth and development] has a special relation to one of the basic elements of society, and this for the simple reason that the human life cycle and man's institutions have evolved together (1950: 250)", makes an important connection with the structural approach to political science. Robins states the relationship more directly, "Persons with severe psychiatric impairment very seldom come to power unless the political environment is itself quite out of the ordinary (1977: 14)". Drawing on Erikson seminal's work, Chickering and Reisser (1993) focused on seven vectors of development or "major highways for journeying toward individuation, the discovery and refinement of one's unique way of being, and also

communion with other individuals and groups" (Chickering and Reisser 1993, p.35). Specifically, Chickering and Reisser's theory focuses on the emotional, interpersonal, and ethical development along with intellectual development. Apart from that, social identity development allows for a deeper understanding of how an individual constructs his various social identities, namely, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation (Gardner, 2009). Helms and Cook (2005) provided an insightful overview of racial and ethnic identity development models, describing racial and ethnic identity development as "the process of development by which individual members of the various socioracial groups overcome the version of internalized racism that typifies their group in order to achieve a self-affirming and realistic racial-group or collective identity" (Helms and Cook 2005, p. 244).

Both in theory and method, the cultural approach seems the most readily compatible with psychosocial theory. As Lasswell puts it, "The life – history configuration is precisely the one which has special meaning for the study of culture, and has its own valid place as an object of investigation in the world of events (1930: 261). "Erikson's eight stages also incorporate the interplay of culture and the individual and are strengthened by their applicability in a variety of different cultures.

Considering their compatibility with each of the dominant trends in political science, it seems logical that as the discipline moves forward, psychosocial theory will fill the theoretical space it created for itself in the last century.

Perhaps the most influential of the political psychology writers is Harold Lasswell. In his seminal work, he set forth a formula of a political man that continues to be useful today.

Lasswell conceptualizes the constitution of political man in the formula $p\}r= P$, a graphic demonstration of how political man's private motives are displaced onto public objects and then rationalized in terms of public interest (1930:67). Erikson echoes Lasswell's formula: "Now and again however, an individual is called upon...

to lift his individual parenthood to the level of a universal one and to try to solve for all what he could not solve for himself alone" (1958:67), is almost an exact reformulation as it is clear that his patienthood corresponds to Lasswell's private motives, lifting to the universal level corresponds to Lasswell's displacement, and solving for all corresponds to Lasswell's rationalization. This process of projection applies also to the Pinochet case and may help explain why Chile was such a violent place under his rule.

The study of political leadership needs not be relegated only to the study of pathological leadership. On the contrary, psychosocial theory can be applied to all political leaders, indeed, all persons, as Erikson shows using data gathered from a large sample of non patients. His work uses statistically normal people to demonstrate the interconnectedness of soma, psyche, and society in all people (1950: 97-108). Graham Little, explores the psychology and the appeal of "middle way" or "third way" political leaders, he describes the Middle way leaders who like to see themselves merely as modernizers, and includers, never as subversives and winners (2009). Moss and Ngu suggested that the personality of transformational leadership and the adaptation to specific contexts, implies that perhaps the effects of various leadership styles might vary across Circumstances (2006). In reference to "genetic" studies, that is studies of personality formation, Robins points out that such studies are useful in analyzing political leaders that are not necessarily pathological but who have been greatly affected either by psychiatric impairment (as opposed to disability) or by severe psychological stress (1977: 9). This allows the researcher to avoid weakening her argument by classifying her subject somewhat arbitrarily according to pre-defined categories or diagnosing an illness that may not be present. This, in turn, demarcates political sciences and psychiatry and allows the researcher to focus on the greater purpose of ones research-to explain political phenomenon and to contribute to political theory.

In choosing to study a leader's role in political phenomena, Fred Greenstein suggests that researchers demonstrate three things. First, the circumstances must

be such that the individual can make an impact on the event. Second, it must be shown that a particular individual's decision-making is in some way different from what other individuals in the same circumstances would do. Finally, it must be shown that a certain event lends itself to the manifestation of the certain personal characteristic that the leader displays. Within this framework, the Pinochet case presents itself as the ideal case study of the impact of an individual leader's personality on the initiation of state terror. In the first regard, state terror was initiated immediately following a military coup when the concentration of power in the hands of military leaders makes it likely that one actor will impact the ensuing events.

Second, because the military junta that took power consisted of four people, it is possible to compare the actions of each of those four leaders, to show that it was Pinochet's personality over the others that had a significant impact on the decision to use violence. Finally, the solemn irreversibility of the coup and the freedom that it entailed for the leaders of hierarchical institutions made the events particularly susceptible to the influence of the personal characteristics of the members of the junta.

Robins speaks of three interactions between the pathologically deviant and his political environment: recruitment into power, behavior / function in power, and removal from power. Before we can find an explanation for how Pinochet's personality contributed to the initiation of state terror in Chile, it is important to take a look at how he was recruited into power.

According to Robins, there are five ways in which pathological leaders are recruited to power: cooptation, agency, conscription, bureaucratic ascent, and self – starting. Pinochet's recruitment into power combines the characteristics of bureaucratic ascent and self – starting. Only after Pinochet had risen through the ranks of the Army was he in a position to play a major role in the coup. Undoubtedly, Pinochet was a good soldier, but as Robins suggests, some behavioral patterns that aid the process of advancement in a bureaucracy become pathological once the person gains a position of power

(1977: 69). Indeed, after the coup, Pinochet used a sly but of trickery to declare himself President. First, he argued his seniority among the members of the junta, of which he was the second senior after General Leigh of the Air Force, on the basis that his institution was most senior. Then, when the decree assigning him the presidency was to be publicly announced, the other members of the junta were notified only after the press was alerted and the Supreme Court was ordered to preside over the ceremony (O'Shaughnessy 2000). In reference to self-starting leaders, Robins, like Erikson, repeats Lasswell's classic formula, "The hyper-suspicious person who projects his personal pathologies on public objects and rationalize them in the public interest is probably one of the most common types of pathological politicians... it would be expected that he would appear in times of social disorganization, and it would also be expected that his excessive fears-ordinarily deviant-might in these times resonate with the larger society's fears" (Robins 1977: 72). Only in the extreme circumstances in the months following the coup could such a blatant disregard for political processes and institutions have been accepted by the people of a country with the deep democratic tradition that characterized Chilean history up to that point.

Erikson's Eight Stages of Man

Why would a good soldier choose to act this way? Robin's critique of political scientists provides one clue. He contends that political scientists have a tendency to overlook the leader's pre-political characteristics- the genesis of his or her madness. To answer this critique, Erikson's eight stages of development will be used to bring a sense of totality to Pinochet's personality.

Erikson describes the eight states of development as "a list of ego qualities which emerge from critical periods of development – criteria (identity is one) by which the individual demonstrates that his ego, at a given stage, is strong enough to integrate the timetable of the organism with the structure of social institution at a specific stage of development. This treatment of the Pinochet case looks at the first four phases of Pinochet's

development and attempts to relate them to the initiation of state terror after the coup. During the first stage, the newly born child is faced with a crisis in which the young being, highly dependent on his mother, will either learn basic trust or mistrust. In the second stage, as the infant learns to hold on and let go, his new skill will either fill him with a sense of autonomy or of shame doubt. During this phase, variable amounts of discipline, protection, and freedom granted for the child by adults strongly influenced the child's ability to resolve his crisis. As he stands up in the third stage, the child begins preparing for adulthood by using his new ability to carry out whatever plans may come to him. However, in carrying out his plans and reflecting on his actions, he is faced with the crisis of initiative (renewed hope) versus guilt (self-disgust). During the fourth phase, the child begins school at which point he seems himself in relationship to his peers and must solve the crisis of industry versus inferiority. While it is not possible to elaborate on each of the stages here, it is important to draw attention to two important characteristics of Erikson's framework.

First, timing plays an important role in development. Slow or late development in one stage of an individual's growth certainly affects the later stages. Thus, the cumulative nature of this framework justifies a magnified look at the principal, genetic stages. Second, as shown in Table (1), Erikson's Framework is fundamentally three-dimensional, interdisciplinary, and synthetic. Throughout his work, Erikson consistently demonstrates the fusion of three aspects of man:

We are speaking of three processes, the Somatic Process, the Ego Process, and the Societal Process. In the history of science, these three processes have belonged to three different scientific disciplines-biology, psychology, and social sciences each of which studied what it could isolate, count, and dissect. Our thinking is dominated by this trichotomy because only through the inventive methodologies of these disciplines do we have knowledge at all. Unfortunately, however, this knowledge is tied to the conditions under which it was secured. In all of these cases, then, a scientific discipline

prejudiced the matter under observation by actively dissolving its total living situation in order to be able to make an isolated section of it amenable to a set of

instruments or concepts (1950: 36-37).

In our scientific search for explanations, then, we must turn to synthesis

Table (1): Adapted from Erikson, E. 1950. Childhood and Society.

Stage	Physical Element	Psychological Crisis	Social Institution
VIII.	Maturity	Ego integrity vs. despair	Fellowship / leadership
VII.	Adulthood	Generativity vs. stagnation	Generative succession
VI.	Puberty / Adolescence	Identity vs. role confusion	Ideology
V.	Young adulthood	Intimacy vs. isolation	Ethical sense
IV.	Latency	Industry vs. inferiority	Technology
III.	Locomotors – genital	Initiative vs. guilt	Economy
II.	Muscular anal	Autonomy vs. shame and doubt	Law and order
I.	Oral sensory	Basic trust vs. basic mistrust	Religion

Personality and Political Violence – A Synthesis

The foremost thinker amongst students of political violence is Ted Robert Gurr. In a widely cited 1981 article written with Mark Lichbach, he tested three hypotheses outlining a self – perpetuating cycle of violence. However, this study, as well as previous ones that focused primarily on the causes of violence, the state failed to explain why or how states chose violence over other policy options. In that article, the researchers concluded, "The properties of the actions which initiate conflict cycles – the extent of protests and rebellion – are not well explained within the model. Moreover, it seems that the focus of most conflict researchers on explaining why people rebel' rather than 'why regimes repress' is justified (25)". Yet five years later, Gurr balanced his approach with a theoretical proposition for the conditions of state violence. This work proves consistent with his earlier in work in that state terror is conceptualized as but one manifestation of an ongoing conflict between elites and non – elites.

In this chapter, he delineated fourteen conditions as characteristics of the following aspects of the political environment: challengers to the regime (as perceived by

regime), the regime and its political ideology, the structure, and the international system. In addition, Gurr indicates which conditions he believes have precipitated in state violence and those that may lead to state terror as defined above (see introduction), the principal difference between the two lying in what Gurr calls terror's instrumentality – that is its intended effects on a group beyond its victims (1986).

The genius in the framework, however, lies in its adaptability to competing approaches in political science. According to Gurr, situational characteristics (1-4,5,7 in Table 2) correspond to elite decision making and are thus compatible with the rational choice approach. Five conditions (10-14) define the structural relationship between elites and non – elites and are therefore compatible with structural explanations. Finally, three dispositional variables (6,8,9) of normative character correspond to cultural analysis (1986, 62-65). At this point, one must logically ask how this theory of political violence can be applied in conjunction with Erikson's eight stages as discussed earlier. Thus, the complexity of the problem presents itself.

Table (2):Adapted from Gurr, T.R. in Stohl and Lopez, 1986.

Gurr's Conditions of State Terrorism			
Group	Characteristic	Condition for	
		SV	ST
Challengers			
1.	Greater political threat, greater likelihood of regime violence	X	X
2.	Greater latent support, greater likelihood of regime violence		X
3.	Use of terror/ guerrilla tactics increases likelihood of state terror		X
4.	Marginal groups w/o elite support more likely victim of ST		X
Regime			
5.	Weak regime more likely to use violence	X	
6.	Takes power violently more likely to use violence in power	X	
7.	Situational terror likely → state terror		X
8.	Initial decision to use ST modeled after use by another regime		X
9.	Democratic principles decrease likelihood of SV and ST	X	X
Soc. Structure			
10.	Greater heterogeneity/ stratification greater likelihood of SV/ST	X	X
11.	Minority elites in stratified society likely → state terror		X
In't System			
12.	External threats increase likelihood of SV domestically	X	
13.	Involvement in big power conflict → extreme SV	X	
14.	Peripheral status increase likelihood of impunity for SV	X	
Proposed Synthesis			
Head of State			
15.	Likelihood of state terror increases with increased violent potential of individual leader		X
SV-state violence		St- state terror → leads to	

This researcher proposes a synthesis of both Erikson and Gurr's work. This synthesis begins with the addition of a fifteenth characteristic: likelihood of state increases with increased violent potential of individual leader (head of state). This differs from characteristic #5 above in that the regime may be weak or strong, new or firmly established. In addition, this would be the only characteristic that applies to one individual only rather than an institutionalized ruling regime which, using Gurr's definition ("incumbents and policies of the

moment [1986:46"]) may include more than one person as well as numerous ideas / ideologies. As such, this new characteristic would have to fall under a fifth grouping: head of state (see Table 2). It is classified as a condition for state terror rather than state violence because of psychosocial theory's inherent concern with patterns of behavior and personal motives.

The characteristic cannot be considered present unless it qualifies according to the three demonstrates:

- 1- Action indispensability: a historical moment in

which an individual personality has the political opportunity to impact events.

2- Actor indispensability: the leader must be in a unique position or possess some unique quality (i.e. charisma) which allows his particular personality to impact events.

3- Structural susceptibility to the projection of the leader's personality: the coincidence of the social structure's malleability with those unique psychological characteristics of the leader.

Only when all three of these conditions are met, can the researcher proceed. As the above three conditions are necessary but not sufficient to qualify the leader's personality as potentially violent, further work needs to be done to determine the leader's potential impact.

A balanced evaluation of the leader's personality is best achieved through the use of a focused analytical narrative. As the researcher works through the stages of the individual's life, the narrative will center around three focal points. First, the researcher will evaluate the historical patterns of both the state and the subject. This portion aims to situate the leader socially, culturally, and historically by looking at the relevant institutions and locating the subject within them. Second, the researcher will evaluate the historical patterns of both the state and the subject. This portion aims to situate the leader socially, culturally, and historically by looking at the relevant institutions and locating the subject within them. Second, the researcher will evaluate the subject's development, focusing on any ruptures between the individual ego and the social institution that corresponds to the given stage of development. Finally, the researcher will analyze the manifestation of the subject's development crises. In what ways did the subject overcome, succumb to or avoid the crises? What behavioral patterns have been formed as a result? Only after this rigorous process, can the researcher provide a balanced evaluation of the leader's potential for violence and thus decide whether or not the fifteenth characteristic applies in the synthetic framework.

While this new approach is indubitably imperfect, it does provide a useful springboard for further research

and theoretical refinement. Without emphasizing one approach over the other, this framework is accessible to a variety of ideological backgrounds and may help researchers to ward a more parsimonious analysis of the complex causes of the initiation of state terror. Moreover, it makes use of a systematic approach to personality without draining of its essentially individual nature. Of course the best measure of its usefulness will be its explanatory power after critical trial. The following analysis considers the events that led up to the outbreak of violence in Chile on September 11, 1973.

Chile's Democratic Traditions

Prisoners were bound at the wrists and ankles, and the wrists and ankles were tied together behind the victim's back. Prisoners were then hoisted on a wooden pole with the weight of the body tearing at the shoulders, wrists, knees, and ankles with the slightest movement of the body. It was an absolutely vulnerable position, and victims of the perch were often beaten and shocked while at the mercy of their interrogators (Ensalco 2000, 91 – 92).

Though the Pinochet case is well known, there is little agreement regarding why the state terrorized with such cruelty, especially given Chile's reputation as an island of democracy in an otherwise turbulent Latin America. Dependency theorists attribute the violence to the international political economic system via measures taken by the U.S. intended to cripple the Chilean economy during the Allende years (Kerbo 1978, Kowalwski, 1991), while Midlarsky work explains the violence in terms of conflict sent and received between the Chilean government and the international system (David and Ward, 1990). As these studies show, there is still much work to be done to explain the initiation of state terror in Chile.

Before 1973, Chile had a long standing democratic tradition extended back to its independence from Spain in 1817, and having been interrupted only once and briefly so from 1924 to 1932 when five military coups rearranged Chilean party politics (Scully, 1992). Yet, the circumstances surrounding this brief period merit some detail. President Arturo Alessandri's anticlerical Liberal Alliance government had been rendered useless as its

diverse coalition fragmented over legislative demands. As a result, on September 10, 1924 a junta consisting of three high ranking military officers closed Congress and took control of the government. This, however, was done only after a group of soldiers had gone to Congress two days earlier to force (by rattling their swords) an end to the legislative stalemate that had been gripping Congress. That same day, Alessandri attempted to resign but was stopped by Congress who granted him only a six-month recess from office; hardly the image of the violent Latin American military coup. Eventually, the countercoup plotter that brought Alessandri back to power in May 1925 (just long enough to rewrite the constitution), Colonel Carlos Ibanez del Campo, came to power in 1927. He immediately outlawed communism and socialism and began arresting and exiling their party leaders and others as well. The depression pushed Ibanez out of power suddenly in 1931 leaving a power vacuum that would not be filled until Alessandri would once again be elected to office in late 1932 (Scully 1992). During this period, Pinochet grew from a boy of nine years to a young man of seventeen.

Perhaps the most profound effect of this time was a reaffirmation of legality in Chile. Alessandri was not the only one to survive the turmoil. When Ibanez stepped down in 1931, the Supreme Court was still there and capable of taking power after a series of failed coups and organized elections. The 1925 Constitution survived. And even after Ibanez's repression, the political party system realigned itself, further to the left this time, and slated candidates for the elections. Ayres summarizes the political culture in this eerie and telling comment, "In pre-UP Chile, there had been a virtual obsession with constitutionalism... The concern with the constitutionality of Proposed initiatives has taken on the aura of the fetishistic" (1973m 507). Instead of going to the presidential palace, the 1920s coup leaders went to Congress; instead of killing the President, they had him resign. Thus, legality characterized the political culture in which young Tito (as Pinochet was known as a child) was socialized.

This emphasis on constitutionality and a long democratic tradition, however, should not be

misconstrued to suggest that Chile's economic and political systems did not have their problems. Economically speaking, the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 brought huge losses to Chilean Port cities as ships took the new, short route. This increased the importance of copper and nitrate exports to the national economy, thereby intensifying the impact of world prices on domestic well – being. Of course, the nitrates market soon collapsed with the invention of artificial fertilizers (O'Shaughnessy, 36). In the north, buzzing mining towns went silent. The depression also hit Chile particularly hard when exports of copper and nitrates that were valued in 1929 at 200 million pesos, in 1932 only brought in 18.1 million pesos (Scully 1992, 86). For most people, living conditions were further exacerbated by a political economic system in which a small elite controlled economic interests and in which powerful sectoral interest groups largely determined policy. As Ayres puts it, "The state was reduced to the role of a passive arbiter of the major interests in Chilean society (512)". To make matters worse, the fragmentation that paralyzed Congress during Alessandri's first term became a regular symptom of Chilean governance right up through the Allende years.

The most striking observation of the Allende years is the absence of turmoil. Though society became increasingly polarized during the final days of the Allende regime and despite American efforts at sabotaging the Chilean economy, Allende in particular, and the government in general maintained its legitimacy. Especially considering the fall of the price of copper on the world market, times were rough in Chile, but for the most part, the system stayed in tact. In his 1973 article, Ayres notes, "Among Latin American countries, Chile continues to be distinguished by the relative absence of sizable social aggregates capable of taking the law into their own hands as well as by the relative absence of official repression. The general impression in Chile is still one of relative absence of overt civil strife and civil disorder (502)". Here, he inadvertently discredits the Pinochet regime's oft repeated assertion of the threat posed by the militant left. In fact, the left was neither

isolated from the political mainstream nor did it espouse an ideology of violence on a wide scale. Indeed, the left was not uniformly if violent at all. According to the analysis of one Chilean historian:

In short, within the left and the UP, the option for armed struggle formed a complex question about which no consensus existed and which had little material relation to its rhetoric... Paradoxically, the situation was similar within the armed forces... although there was consensus about anti – Marxism within military ranks, there was little agreement about the role of repression (Ortiz de Zarate, 2003: 184-185).

It seemed then that neither the left nor the military was actively preparing for the events that would soon unravel. How, then, can the terror be explained?

One important factor to keep in mind is that the large majority of people were just trying to make it through their everyday lives and due to the above mentioned characteristics of the political system, not a few had little reason to believe that the government would do something to alleviate their economic hardships. This may have created just the space needed for a regime that needed to become everything. As Ayres put it, "In general, anything which increases the average Chilean's belief that the government is doing something to alleviate his plight, anything which can act to rectify the belief that *aqui no manda nadie* [here nobody is in charge], will assist the regime to extricate itself from past constraints (521, translation added)", While Ayres is speaking about revolutionary potential of the Allende government, unaware of the events that would take place two months after the article's publication, his analysis is more than anything an assessment of the Chilean political culture in general and the applicability of this statement to the military junta is chilling.

Development of a Dictator

Having met the necessary conditions as outlined above in order to consider the individual leader's role in explaining political violence, and having drawn up a brief historical background, this work will now turn to analysis of the subject's development. As stated earlier,

this paper will primarily employ the first four stages in Erikson's framework to analyze Pinochet's role in the initiation of state terror although the other stages will receive some comment. Most data are taken from Pinochet's memories *Camino Recorrido* and are thus limited to the idiosyncrasies of his memory and of his motives to retell the story his way. Despite these limitations, the work proves useful when read critically in search of the meaning behind Pinochet's eagerness to set the record straight.

Stage I

While the first years of Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's life are not clearly distinguished, it is possible to analyze the manifestations of young Tito's struggles to resolve the various crises of childhood. Born November 25, 1951, just a year after the opening of the Panama Canal, Augusto's childhood is marked by the incomplete resolution of his developmental crises and multiple ruptures with the social institutions in which they are codified. According to Erikson, the ego defensive mechanisms of projection and introjection have their roots in that earliest stage of development when the young child learns to distinguish the world within and without his body. This process coincides with the infant's trust versus mistrust crisis. While for obvious reasons Pinochet does not talk at length about this period of his life, he does leave some clues that provide insight into how he experienced this first crisis. First, young Tito spent much of his childhood under the care of a *ninera* from whom on more than one occasion he tried to escape and run home to his mother, Avelina. He recalls his first day at nursery school when after crying at length upon his mother's departure, he sneaks away just as soon as the teacher looks away and runs home. Upon his arrival at home, he is neither praised for his courage (after an act that to a child certainly seems heroic) nor punished for his misbehavior, but laughed at by his mother. Erikson compares the trust (or mistrust) learned at this stage with the institutionalized faith of religion. Later in life, Pinochet's mistrust is specifically manifested through the Catholic Church from which, after several years of his repressive rule, he is nearly

excommunicated. His imperfect faith, along with his political motives, later allows him to join the quasi – religious Masons. But his faith to that organization is also weak and after a short time, his name is removed from its roles. Pinochet praises his mother for her religiosity and clearly, though not coincidentally, continues to identify the Catholic Church with his mother throughout his life.

Stage II

The second stage of development corresponds to a given society's institutions of law and order. Through his newly discovered ability to hold on and let go, the child at this stage either learns autonomy and is instilled with a sense of justice or learns shame and doubt which leads to "a secret determination to try to get away with things (Erikson, 1950: 253)". Of all of the crises that he faces, this one carries the most profound implications in the Pinochet case, the manifestations of which are seen in Augusto's obsession with legality through his life. As the reader will remember, in this regard, Pinochet was not alone. According to Ayres, the whole state of Chile shared this obsession with him. There is some reason to believe, however, that this obsession took on special meaning in Tito's case, the foundations of which can be traced to his own recollection of "las pataletas [tantrums, my translation]".

Augusto tells how both he and his brother were often spoiled by his grandmother who gave them everything it occurred to them to ask for. One day when he was with his mother, Tito decided to ask for something. When she didn't give it to him, he began to throw a fit which at first she ignored. When he didn't stop, she grabbed him by the arm and pulled him off to the side spanking him several times. Upon this punishment and a hearty threat that if he didn't stop crying she would pull down his pants and spank him in front of everyone, Tito stopped his crying (Pinochet, 1990: 21)]. What lesson, then, does Tito walk away with? If you want something, don't ask. Avelina's scolding words reflect the role she played in the crises her child had experienced. While at this point, Tito was most certainly beyond the second stage in term of age, this researcher suspects that his mother's threat to

expose his back side if he continued crying conjured up a host of memories that reinforced the shame he had learned during that time and gave fodder to what would manifest as a sneaky shamelessness during his political career. Until that time, Pinochet would continue his rigorous obsession with rules and regulations.

Stage III

Another occasion gives some insight into how Tito may have conceptualized the third crisis in his development – that of initiative versus guilt. On this occasion, he and his brother are sent out to play in the plaza across from their home under the care of the *ninera*. Tito pulls himself loose from her hand and starts running home. As he crosses the street, he is struck by a horse drawn cart which runs over his knee. Two years later when his knee begins to bother him, Avelina takes Tito to the doctor who notifies her that the boy's leg will need to be amputated. Upon receiving this news, Avelina prays to the Virgin of Perpetual Succor vowing that if Tito could keep his leg, she would wear coffee colored clothes for fifteen years and that her son would do the same for ten years if he remained a civilian or two years if he entered the military. She sent the boy to several other doctors who all insisted that the leg needed to be amputated. After some time, Avelina's miracle arrived in the form of a visiting German doctor who expressed irritation at the Chilean doctors' repeated misdiagnoses and prescribed time in the sun to cure the boy's leg. Several dynamic relationships are at play here. First, in his memoir Pinochet describes the *ninera* as careful and responsible, and take responsibility for the entire incident himself. Yet, when upon his failure to carry out the plan that his young mind envisioned would take him to his mother, her reaction complicates his guilt. While it can be argued that there is nothing out of the ordinary about asking the Virgin for help or even for making a vow, the striking dynamic at work in this case is that the boy is then made to fulfill the mother's promise before God which eventually he does upon his graduation from the Military School. Furthermore, the researcher speculated that Avelina's emotional pleas to the Virgin were motivated at least in part by some sense of guilt in

Avelina herself that the child was under the care of another woman when he got hurt. Finally, when her (and his) miracle comes, it comes not from God, not from Chile, but from Germany.

Stage IV

The uncertainty, doubt, and guilt that by this point dominated young Tito's emotional landscape certainly went with him as he went off to school. At this stage, the child experiences the crisis between industry and inferiority as he is thrown into a world without parents and begins to evaluate his position in terms of his peers. Two important factors influence Tito's ability to deal with this crisis: first, he becomes a mediocre student and second, most of his classmates come from families with more wealth than his. These two factors may help to explain why throughout his life, he continues to show an obsession with position. The first page of *Camino Recorrido* makes three references to his family's servants, but only one to his parents. O'Shaughnessy describes how Pinochet "remained always acutely aware of position" in relating the following story:

"..... towards the end of a particularly long and tiring Junta meeting, Pinochet pasued and barked out, 'Mendoza, three coffees!' The Carabinero General, abashed, stammered, 'But Augusto, I'm a general and a member of the Junta like the rest of you! Pinochet shot back, 'OK, Menocita, four coffees!' (2000: 80).

Such behavior most likely has its basis in this latent stage of development. It was at this stage in his life when ninera who had taken care of Tito and his brother fell in love with a police sergeant who courted her by spoiling the children and giving them money to play. This incident reinforces several interrelated ideas in young Tito's mind. First, the young child certainly equates the police sergeant with his uniform which could just as well be military.

Second, the man in the uniform has money. And finally, if it were not for the man in the uniform, the woman would love the children and care for them. Thus, as a child who at this stage has already come to consider his role as a man in the future, Tito related the capacity of man to take a woman away from her children to money and uniform. Throughout his school years, all of these

patterns are reinforced so that at the time Augusto heads off to the Military School (on his third attempt at acceptance), the most important characteristics that constitute his violent potential have already been formed.

A Good Soldier

Young Augusto passes his fifth crisis between identity and role diffusion within the confines of the Military School where the sameness of military training works in his favor, alleviating some of the pressure built up during his school years. In the military, Augusto's preoccupation with position is channeled through strict hierarchy and his obsession with legality and order are greatly rewarded as the young soldier moves quickly up the ranks. Eventually, he marries Lucia Hiriart, the daughter of a politician, a woman much like his mother but nearly young enough to be his daughter (she is fifteen when they met, twelve years his junior). Throughout their marriage, Hiriart would show unflinching commitment to her husband. She once said, "If I was head of government I'd be much harder than my husband. I'd have the whole of Chile under a state of siege (O'Shaughnessy, 2000: 64)". With a dedicated wife, healthy children, and a successful career, it might seem that Pinochet had little reason to carry out the violence that characterized his regime. However, a deeper look into how those characteristics that defined his childhood were manifested in his decision to use state terror, reveals why the boy General was both motivated and capable of carrying out his crimes.

Holding on and Letting Go and Letting Go and Letting Go

The primary justification used by the Pinochet for its use of terror was the threat that leftist ideas posed to Chile. Yet, despite propagandistic references to the hatred he had for Marxist ideology throughout his military career, there is little evidence that Pinochet's hatred focused on an ideology. In fact, when Allende came to power, Pinochet continued to show his loyalty to the military institution and was appointed as Commander in Chief of the Army by Allende himself. Furthermore, despite months of planning by high level officials in other branches of the military, Pinochet was

not made aware of the plot until three days before the coup (O'Shaughnessy, 2000: 51). Certainly many thoughts passed through the General's mind during those three days as he calculated his best course of action. The researcher speculates that as the fifty – seven year old general mulled over this decision, he relied heavily on his most ingrained senses of morality – those that had been formulated during his childhood.

Pinochet's initial characterization of his parents emphasizes the pride he takes in his father's French heritage and his mother as a symbol of the roots of Chilean society. Within this context, it is important to see the roots of Pinochet's obsession with rules in the strict discipline of his mother. But if Augusto's strict adherence to rules reflects a desire to please his mother, what does it say about his father? Throughout Camino Recorrido, Pinochet uses distinct language in describing his relationship with father and mother. In connection with his mother, Pinochet uses words such as "sometido a (subject to)" while in connection with his father he uses words such as "al lado de (by the side of)". While in many ways Pinochet seems to blame his father for his suffering both economically and emotionally (as a recipient of Avelina's devotion and care), this language suggests that he also identifies with the father and wants his power. In 1973, in the midst of the seventh stage of development, faced with the crisis of generativity versus stagnations as expressed in the institution of succession, the newly appointed Commander in Chief probably spent considerable time thinking about his dead father. Those last three days brought heightened significance to the Generals' crisis.

Would he continue to be "sometido a " the rules and regulations of his mother, holding on and holding back his true desires, shamed into good behavior or would he assert himself, let go, and become a true father? On the afternoon of the ninth, as friends and family gathered in his home to celebrate his daughter's birthday, General Leigh and several other high level officials showed up with a written statement to be signed. By that time Pinochet had made a decision/ still, the junta might have carried out a violent coup without following it with a

pattern of state terror. But, whatever the reservations or motivations of the other members of the junta, the decision that Pinochet had made was about power and his letting go would need to be even greater than his holding on. Unfortunately, the events that followed confirm this.

The above analysis shows that in light of the historical background of the subject, his personal development, and behavior, it can be concluded that Pinochet's personality increased the likelihood of political violence in Chile. The applicability of this fifteenth characteristic to the Chilean case contributes to a well-rounded explanation of the initiation of state terror when considered in conjunction with the ten other conditions outlined by Gurr as precursors to state terror.

CONCLUSION

Thirty years after Pinochet's rise to power, as the globalized economy increases the importance of non – state actors, the need to further the study personality and politics is obvious. The study of political violence presents itself as a field which can benefit greatly from an infusion of psychosocial theory. This paper has proposed a synthetic framework and a process with which to evaluate leaders and their role in political violence in hope of avoiding what Greenstein calls, "many of the standard difficulties in the political personality literature [which] come from the failure to think in a sufficiently broad way about the full configuration of psychological and non – psychological determinates of political behavior (p.6)." In applying this framework to the Chilean case, this research concludes that Pinochet's personality contained within it a potential for violence which when manifested contributed to the onset of state terror after the 1973 coup. Further research can improve on this model by further developing a uniform system of measurement and a more rigorous methodology. There is a marked need for theoretical improvement as well in this only tentatively explored territory between psychology and political science, but the benefits of even imperfect proposals eclipse their shortcomings.

1- Such as by uses of DSM – IV to diagnose mental

illness. (See, Sheng, 2001).

2- The profound implication of such reasoning is outlined below.

3- Due to the gender of the subject, the author will use male descriptors throughout the discussion of development. The theory applies to both genders.

4- In a September 1998 interview with John Lee Anderson of the New York, Pinochet said, "The Chileans will tell you with pride they are often called the English of South America". (O'Shaughnessy, 2000).

5- Pinochet was a prolific writer (though not exactly talented). Beside Camino Recorrido (a three volume text), he also wrote Dia Decisivo (about September 11th), and has published several collections of speeches and

other writings.

6- An interesting avenue of exploration in this regard, though it cannot be thoroughly considered here, is the relationship between the virgin worship prevalent in many corners of the Catholic Church in Latin America and definitions of machismo / manhood. An interesting article that treats both marianismo and machismo is Melhuus, Marit, 1990. A shame to honour - a shame to suffer. *Ethnos* 55(1): 5-25.

7- I use the ambiguous term leftist because the Pinochet regime did not discriminate between communists, socialists, social democrats, or any other ideology for that matter.

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